Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk

Prasenjit Banerjee and Jason Shogren

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 106, issue 1, 45-47

Abstract: This paper examines how preferences for social reputation affect the design of monetary incentives in an efficient mechanism for environmental risk. Our results are a high reputation firm receives less than optimal transfer; the low reputation firm sacrifices information rent.

Keywords: Mechanism; Reputation; Environmental; risk; Information; rent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:1:p:45-47

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