Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

Edmond Baranes and Jean-Christophe Poudou

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 106, issue 3, 172-176

Abstract: This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that "it is easier to collude among equals", applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion.

Keywords: Collusion; Access; Regulation; Vertical; structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:3:p:172-176

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