Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets

Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 106, issue 3, 177-179

Abstract: We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition in Legros and Newman (2007) and is a weakening of existing conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.

Keywords: Nontransferable; utility; Assignment; models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(09)00375-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:3:p:177-179

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().