Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?

Jeroen Klomp and Jakob de Haan

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 106, issue 3, 219-222

Abstract: In this paper we confirm the hypothesis that central bank independence reforms reduce the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. However, the strength of this effect depends on the rule of law and the degree of political polarization.

Keywords: Central; bank; independence; Central; bank; law; reforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:3:p:219-222

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