Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function

Shulin Liu and Mingxi Wang

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 1, 1-3

Abstract: This paper presents a more general independent private value model based on the assumption that Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to make a tradeoff between the probability of winning the unit and the profit under the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. The equilibrium bidding strategies are given and the seller's expected revenue comparisons are made.

Keywords: First-price; and; second-price; sealed-bid; auctions; Bidding; strategy; Expected; revenue; Cobb-Douglas; utility; function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(09)00180-3
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:1-3

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().