Layoff taxes and minimum wage: Two complementary public policies

Frédéric Gavrel, Isabelle Lebon and Therese Rebiere

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 1, 30-32

Abstract: In a matching model in which the job destruction rate and the output are endogenous, we show that the presence of a binding minimum wage prompts firms to choose too risky jobs. Introducing layoff taxes therefore reduces unemployment and improves market efficiency.

Keywords: Employment; protection; Layoff; taxes; Minimum; wage; Equilibrium; unemployment; Market; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Layoff taxes and minimum wage: Two complementary public policies (2010)
Working Paper: Layoff Taxes and Minimum Wage. Two Complementary Public Policies (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:30-32

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