Last-minute bidding in eBay charity auctions

Daniel W. Elfenbein and Brian McManus

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 1, 42-45

Abstract: Relative to typical eBay auctions, bidding in eBay charity auctions occurs earlier and also less frequently in the auctions' final seconds. This suggests that some charity bidders benefit from driving-up others' payments, as when auction revenue is a public good.

Keywords: Charity; auctions; Bid; timing; Bid; sniping; Preferences; for; giving; Online; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:42-45

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