Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

Dan Bernhardt and Mattias K Polborn

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 1, 52-54

Abstract: How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity--one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.

Keywords: Hidden; defenses; Resource; allocation; Security; Randomization; Terrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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