The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

Eva Hoppe and Patrick Schmitz

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 1, 58-62

Abstract: We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

Keywords: Hidden; information; Adverse; selection; Information; gathering. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:58-62

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