Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms

Fuhito Kojima

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 1, 69-70

Abstract: Stability is a central concept in matching theory, while nonbossiness is important in many allocation problems. We show that these properties are incompatible: there does not exist a matching mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy.

Keywords: Matching; Stability; Nonbossiness; Impossibility; theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:69-70

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