Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992)

Yuichiro Kamada and Scott Kominers

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, 112-114

Abstract: We propose a simple model of repeated games with private monitoring and time-varying information structures. We then obtain an example demonstrating that the set of achievable equilibrium payoffs may shrink when players' information regarding opponents' information structures is increased.

Keywords: Correlated; signal; structure; Prisoner's; dilemma; Private; monitoring; Repeated; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:112-114

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