Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule

Yosef Mealem

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, 194-197

Abstract: A group of agents must decide whether or not to undertake a project. A simple mechanism is presented which implements the social choice function when the cost-sharing rule fulfills only two properties: budget balance and payment bounds.

Keywords: Public; good; Efficient; mechanism; Cost-sharing; rule; Symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:194-197

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