A model of criminal sanctions that incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation

Thomas Miceli

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, 205-207

Abstract: This paper adapts the standard economic model of crime to incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation. The results show that adding incapacitation can result in either a longer or a shorter optimal prison term compared to the deterrence-only model.

Keywords: Crime; Deterrence; Incapacitation; Law; enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:205-207

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