Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions

Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Ozbay

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, 217-219

Abstract: Losing the auction at an affordable price generates loser regret. In third price auctions if bidders anticipate loser regret, then in line with the experimental findings, in a symmetric equilibrium the bids are more than the risk neutral Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Overbidding; Third; price; auction; Regret (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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