Shirking and employment protection legislation: Evidence from a natural experiment

Vincenzo Scoppa ()

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, 276-280

Abstract: The Italian employment protection legislation was modified in 1990 making more costly for small firms to dismiss employees. Using a difference-in-differences estimator to compare absenteeism rates in small and large firms we find a strong increase of shirking in small firms.

Keywords: Absenteeism; Shirking; Employment; protection; legislation; Difference-in-differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Working Paper: Shirking and Employment Protection Legislation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:276-280

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