Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule

Mariann Ollár

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, 288-290

Abstract: I show that the majority rule is not "superior" to other rules if independence of irrelevant alternatives is replaced with monotonicity in the Dasgupta and Maskin (2008a) framework. In addition, I introduce a diversity requirement for preferences that restores the superiority of the majority rule in case of monotonicity.

Keywords: Majority; rule; Monotonicity; Well-working; Continuum; number; of; voters; Diverse; domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(10)00076-5
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:288-290

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().