On the design of piece-rate contracts

Arup Bose, Debashis Pal () and David Sappington

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 3, 330-332

Abstract: We characterize the optimal piece-rate contract in the canonical moral hazard setting with a wealth-constrained, risk averse agent. The contract is shown to have a simple, intuitive characterization in a structured, but broad, class of settings.

Keywords: Moral; hazard; Piece-rate; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:3:p:330-332

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