Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty

Robert R. Routledge

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 3, 356-359

Abstract: We analyze the classical model of Bertrand competition in a homogeneous good market with constant marginal costs and uncertainty regarding rivals' costs. First, we show that there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under the conventional equal sharing rule. Second, we illustrate the result for the case of piecewise-affine market demand.

Keywords: Bertrand; competition; Cost; uncertainty; Mixed; strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:3:p:356-359

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