Pareto efficient Nash equilibria in discontinuous games

Vincenzo Scalzo

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 3, 364-365

Abstract: Using the approach of Tian (2009) which characterizes the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic form games, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto efficient Nash equilibria in games where discontinuities on payoffs are allowed.

Keywords: Discontinuous; games; Strategic; form; games; Pareto; efficient; Nash; equilibria; Strong; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(10)00095-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:3:p:364-365

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().