Efficient and strategy-proof voting over connected coalitions: A possibility result

Veronica Block

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 1, 1-3

Abstract: We consider preferences over connected coalitions that are single-peaked with respect to an appropriate betweenness relation. We show that on this preference domain there exist non-dictatorial, strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Generalized; single-peakedness; Efficiency; Connected; coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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