A multilateral telephone bargaining game

Duozhe Li

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 1, 43-45

Abstract: This paper studies a multilateral bargaining game with unanimity rule. Offers and responses are communicated through private telephone conversations, and they are never revealed to all players. With a plausible restriction on beliefs, we obtain a unique perfect public equilibrium.

Keywords: Multilateral; bargaining; Private; offers; and; responses; Unique; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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