Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids

Karthik N. Kannan

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 1, 49-51

Abstract: In a sequential-auction setting, the expected-winning prices are shown to decline across two stages when all bids are revealed between the stages. The prices decline because bidders desire to hide their private valuation information. The hiding also leads to inefficient allocations.

Keywords: Auctions; Sequential; auctions; Declining; price; anomaly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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