Signal jamming in a sequential auction

Wei Ding, Thomas Jeitschko and Elmar Wolfstetter

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 1, 58-61

Abstract: In a sequence of first-price auctions with stable private values bidders strategically conceal their private information until the last auction. We characterize equilibrium bidding and explore how such signal jamming affects the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

Keywords: Auctions; Signaling; Price; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:58-61

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