To lead or not to lead: Endogenous sequencing in public goods games

Stefan D. Haigner and Florian Wakolbinger

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 1, 93-95

Abstract: We compare the influence of endogenous leadership on group's contributions in a public goods game with an exogenously appointed leader and find that groups with voluntary leaders outperform groups with involuntary leaders. The decision to contribute last does not undermine cooperation.

Keywords: Public; goods; Leadership; Endogenous; Sequencing; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:93-95

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