Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations

Ville Korpela

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 3, 283-285

Abstract: The first full characterization of social choice correspondences that are implementable in Nash equilibrium, given in Moore and Repullo (1990), together with the working principle behind an algorithm to check this condition, given in Sjöström (1991), can be used to give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for implementation that is a generalization of monotonicity.

Keywords: (Maskin); Monotonicity; Moore-Repullo-set; Nash; implementation; No; veto; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(10)00212-0
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:283-285

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().