Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained

Viplav Saini

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 3, 303-306

Abstract: Allowing for a reserve price in a dynamic auction with capacity-constrained bidders changes the equilibrium in an unexpected way. The distribution of winning bids contains a mass point; several bidder types "bunch" at the reserve price.

Keywords: Dynamic; auction; Capacity; constraint; Reserve; price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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