Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Rui Li

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 3, 322-326

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. I make the frequent communication folk theorem in Kandori and Matsushima (1998) valid in wider environments by allowing players to make public all private information they could possibly condition their future play on.

Keywords: Repeated; games; Private; monitoring; Folk; theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:322-326

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