Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty

Shinichiro Takizawa

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 3, 337-340

Abstract: We investigate the value of delaying the punishment in private monitoring repeated games with almost-public information when players use a grim trigger strategy. If the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered, the equilibrium set would change.

Keywords: Private; information; Repeated; games; Decisions; under; uncertainty; Irreversibility; Trigger; strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:337-340

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