The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games

William Stanford

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 3, 352-354

Abstract: We show that in random multi-team games, large numbers of pure strategy Nash equilibria are highly probable when the number of teams, the size of teams, or pure strategy set cardinalities are large.

Keywords: Team; games; Multi-team; games; Pure; strategy; Nash; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:352-354

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