Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play

Suresh Naidu, Sung-Ha Hwang and Samuel Bowles

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 109, issue 1, 31-33

Abstract: We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyncratic play is intentional instead of random. In contract games, the stochastically stable state selected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the Nash bargain, rather than the usual Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

Keywords: Stochastic; stability; Nash; bargaining; solution; Multiple; equilibria; Intentionality; Idiosyncratic; play (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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