Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations
Anne Gielen () and
Jan C. van Ours
Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 109, issue 2, 108-111
This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker-firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.
Keywords: Wage; negotiations; Quits; Layoffs; Matched; worker-firm; data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:109:y:2010:i:2:p:108-111
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