Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

Anne Gielen and Jan C. van Ours

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 109, issue 2, 108-111

Abstract: This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker-firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.

Keywords: Wage; negotiations; Quits; Layoffs; Matched; worker-firm; data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:109:y:2010:i:2:p:108-111

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