Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies

Kasper Leufkens, Ronald Peeters and Dries Vermeulen

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 109, issue 3, 139-141

Abstract: We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.

Keywords: Sequential; auctions; Procurement; auctions; Synergies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies (2010)
Working Paper: Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:109:y:2010:i:3:p:139-141

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