Asymmetric reduced form Auctions

Konrad Mierendorff

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 1, 41-44

Abstract: This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail.

Keywords: Asymmetric; auction; Reduced; form; Feasibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:1:p:41-44

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