Soft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitals

Karen Eggleston and Yu-Chu Shen

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 1, 7-11

Abstract: Consistent with the property rights theory of ownership incorporating soft budget constraints (SBCs), we find that controlling for SBCs, for-profit hospitals drop safety-net services more often and exhibit higher mortality rates, suggesting aggressive cost control that damages non-contractible quality.

Keywords: Soft; budget; constraints; Ownership; Health; care; For-profit; Hospital; quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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