The fixed wage puzzle: Why profit sharing is so hard to implement

Jürgen Jerger and Jochen Michaelis ()

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 2, 104-106

Abstract: Profit sharing arrangements Pareto-dominate fixed wage contracts, but are (far) less than ubiquitous. We account for this fixed wage puzzle by adopting a perspective of bounded rationality. Specifically, plausible share arrangements are not generally acceptable to both firms and unions.

Keywords: Profit; sharing; Share; economy; Remuneration; systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement (2010)
Working Paper: The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement (2010)
Working Paper: The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:2:p:104-106

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