Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions

Juan Momparler and Pablo Gregori

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 3, 220-222

Abstract: We propose a simple qualitative methodology for improving the understanding of the nature of equilibrium strategies in asymmetric first-price sealed-bid auctions when departures from symmetry are weak. We exemplify this methodology through the exposition of three examples already studied in literature (Maskin and Riley, 2000a; Fibich and Gavious, 2003; Bajari, 2001).

Keywords: Asymmetric; game; Auction; Phase; plane (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:220-222

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