How lotteries outperform auctions

Olivier Bos

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 3, 262-264

Abstract: In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among participants with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.

Keywords: All-pay; auctions; Charity; Complete; information; Lotteries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: How lotteries outperform auctions (2011)
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