Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 3, 272-273

Abstract: There are two feasible alternatives. We impose a weak version of anonymity on an arbitrary social choice function, which selects a single alternative at each profile. It implies majority rule in the presence of neutrality and monotonicity.

Keywords: Anonymity; Monotonicity; Neutrality; Social; choice; function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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