Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups

Stephanie Wang

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 1, 30-33

Abstract: Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 x 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.

Keywords: Belief; elicitation; Incentives; Belief; aggregation; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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