Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand

Lutz-Alexander Busch and Phil Curry

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 1, 40-42

Abstract: If willingness to pay depends on characteristics of other attendees, a monopolist will use a lineup as a screening mechanism only if a consumer's characteristic is inversely related to her cost of lining up. No capacity constraint is necessary.

Keywords: Excess; demand; Two-part; pricing; Scalping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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