Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions

Harrison Cheng

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 1, 78-80

Abstract: We show by an example that in first-price IPV auctions, asymmetry in bidders' valuations need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same amount of social surplus. Asymmetry need not reduce competition in first-price auctions.

Keywords: Asymmetry; Revenue; effect; First-price; auctions; Private; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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