Games of social interactions with local and global externalities

Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber ()

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 1, 88-90

Abstract: In this paper we present a result on the existence of pure strategies Nash equilibrium which covers a large class of games with local and global social interactions. The result highlights common features of well-known games analyzed in the literature.

Keywords: Social; interactions; Conformity; Externalities; Potential; function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:1:p:88-90

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