Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders

Xu Tan and Yiqing Xing

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 1, 99-103

Abstract: This paper shows the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in auctions with both common-value bidders and private-value ones. In equilibrium, the common-value bidders bid less aggressively when there are more private-value bidders. Further, resale is discussed as an application.

Keywords: Asymmetry; Second-price; auction; Monotone; equilibrium; Resale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(10)00219-3
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:1:p:99-103

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().