Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games

Veronika Grimm () and Friederike Mengel

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 2, 113-115

Abstract: Delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance of low offers. While in treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, 60-80% are accepted as we delay the acceptance decision by around 10Â min.

Keywords: Ultimatum; Bargaining; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(11)00035-8
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:2:p:113-115

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().