On the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in two person discrete games

Indrajit Mallick ()

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 2, 144-146

Abstract: We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that, when best responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Pure; strategy; Nash; equilibrium; Best; response; Minimal; Acyclicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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