Charity auctions with multiple goods: Bidding behavior and revenue

Vivienne Groves

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 2, 166-169

Abstract: In a charity auction with multiple goods, we show that the highest-losing bid uniform price auction revenue dominates its lowest-winning bid counterpart. Only in the highest-losing bid uniform price auction is bidding independent of the number of goods and players and revenue increasing in the number of goods.

Keywords: Charity; auctions; Warm; glow; Externalities; Altruism; Fund-raising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:2:p:166-169

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