On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 3, 243-246

Abstract: This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.

Keywords: Bargaining; Nash; bargaining; solution; Subgame; perfect; equilibrium; Stationary; strategies; Multiplicity; of; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria (2010)
Working Paper: On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria (2009)
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