Destructing the hold-up

Travis Ng ()

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 3, 247-248

Abstract: In an example of hold-up, giving the investing party the ability to destroy his relationship-specific investment can accommodate equilibria without under-investment. It suggests that destruction can be a possible incentive device in enhancing efficiency in bilateral relationships with hold-up.

Keywords: Destruction; Bilateral; relationship; Hold-up (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:247-248

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