On the efficiency of participation with vertically differentiated workers

Frédéric Gavrel

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 1, 100-102

Abstract: In this journal Albrecht et al. (2010) assume that the planner problem is constrained by participation decisions. When this constraint is relaxed participation is too high whereas market tightness is too low. Subsidizing non-participants improves market efficiency and reduces unemployment.

Keywords: Search; Matching; Efficiency; Participation; Hosios; rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176511001376
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: On the efficiency of participation with vertically differentiated workers (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:100-102

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().