Endogenous monetary commitment

Jan Libich and Petr Stehlík

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 1, 103-106

Abstract: We develop an asynchronous framework in which each player can optimally select the frequency of his moves based on cost-benefit considerations. To demonstrate how such ability to commit can alleviate coordination problems, we apply the framework to monetary policy.

Keywords: Commitment; Endogenous; timing; Asynchronous; games; Strict; vs.flexible; inflation; targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Endogenours monetary commitment (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:103-106

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